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Knowledge-Yielding Communication 
 
Andrew Peet 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Linguistic communication allows for the acquisition of  testimonial knowledge. This is one of  its central 
functions.1 Thus, a central task for the theory of  linguistic communication is to explain how it is that, 
through the interpersonal exchange of  auditory, visual, and tactile stimuli, the communicative 
preconditions for the acquisition of  testimonial knowledge (or, the conditions for ‘knowledge-yielding 
communication’) regularly come to be satisfied. Yet there is, at present, no satisfactory account of  
knowledge-yielding communication. Thus, this central success condition for linguistic theorizing is 
currently opaque, and we are left with an incomplete understanding of  testimony, and communication 
more generally, as a source of  knowledge.  
 
It is natural to hold that knowledge-yielding communication occurs whenever two or more interlocutors 
coordinate on the same proposition or set of  truth conditions. However, such coordination can occur as 
a matter of  luck. This is inconsistent with the acquisition of  knowledge. Moreover, communication does 
not always involve the duplication of  thoughts. It often involves the quasi-inferential reconstruction of  
thoughts. This suggests that much communication is approximate, meaning that exact coordination is 
rare. Yet this does not preclude the acquisition of  testimonial knowledge. A natural response to the first 
problem is to strengthen the conditions on knowledge-yielding communication, holding, for example, 
that interlocutors must know that they are coordinating on the same contents.2 A natural response to the 
second problem is to weaken the conditions on knowledge-yielding communication, holding that 
interlocutors need only entertain relevantly similar propositions or sets of  truth conditions. These 
responses pull in opposing directions.  
 
The account presented here resolves this tension by modeling knowledge-yielding communication on 
knowledge itself. It is argued that knowledge-yielding communication occurs iff  interlocutors coordinate 
on truth values in a non-lucky and non-deviant way. I primarily focus on the anti-luck component of  the 
account here, due to the explanatory work it is able to do.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows: §2 clarifies our core question, relating the question of  knowledge-
yielding communication to the more general task of  providing a complete epistemology of  testimony. §3 
criticizes the view that knowledge-yielding communication occurs iff  interlocutors coordinate on the 
same content. §4 criticizes “similar content” approaches. The critical discussion in §3 and §4 forms the 
basis of  the positive view, which is presented in §5 and §6. §5 presents a pure anti-luck approach. §6 
explains how the anti-luck approach is incomplete, and provides the formula for completing it.3 
                                                 
1 The spread of  knowledge is not the only important function of  language. Language functions, for example, as a means 
for social bonding and collective action, and also as a means for degradation, subordination, and control. However, the 
spread of  knowledge is clearly an important function of  language. So one central task of  the theory of  language is to 
explain how linguistic communication enables the spread of  knowledge. 
2 Heck (1995) provides a view along these lines, although they merely require knowledge of  truth conditions, allowing that 
interlocutors may entertain propositions containing slightly different senses. 
3 A note on methodology before we begin: The argument relies on judgments about cases. Usually these judgments will be 
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2. The Core Question 
 
Our core question is as follows: 
 
QUESTION: What are the purely communicative preconditions for the acquisition of  
testimonial knowledge? 
 
This question needs to be clarified. No relation of  communication alone will be sufficient for the 
acquisition of  testimonial knowledge. A testimonial exchange could be unproblematic along the 
communicative dimension, yet still fail to yield testimonial knowledge due, for example, to the speaker’s 
dishonesty, or the audience’s lack of  trust. When an agent fails to gain testimonial knowledge in such 
circumstances the communicative preconditions for the acquisition of  testimonial knowledge are met. 
The audience’s inability to acquire testimonial knowledge is not explained by any breakdown in 
communication. We are concerned, in this paper, with the conditions which are met when an audience 
acquires testimonial knowledge, or when an audience’s inability to acquire testimonial knowledge is 
explained by some non-communicative defect in the exchange.4 
 
To get clear on this, it will be instructive to consider some examples: 
 
GOOD: Mary and Petra are both native English speakers. Moreover, they are good friends, and 
have strong reasons to trust one another.  Mary knows that Petra’s friend Tom is in town, and 
she wants to share this knowledge with Petra. So she clearly states to Petra that ‘Tom is in town’. 
Petra hears and understands Mary’s assertion. On this basis she comes to believe that Tom is in 
town.  
 
In this case Petra gains knowledge. Both the communicative and non-communicative preconditions for 
the acquisition of  testimonial knowledge are satisfied. By contrast, consider the following:  
 
BAD: Mary and Petra are both native English speakers. Moreover, they have been friends, and 
Petra has strong reasons to trust Mary. Nonetheless, Mary has developed a bitterness toward 
Petra, and wishes to deceive her.  Mary believes that Petra’s friend Tom is in town, but she 
doesn’t want Petra to know this.  So she clearly states to Petra that ‘Tom is out of  town’. Petra 
hears and understands Mary’s assertion. On this basis she comes to believe that Tom is out of  
town. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
given theoretical support. In particular, I will repeatedly motivate a diagnosis of  knowledge or failure of  knowledge by 
considering whether or not a belief  is held and true in a non-lucky and non-deviant way. It is an assumption of  this paper 
that knowledge is, roughly, non-deviant non-lucky true belief  (where non-deviance is taken to imply justification, and 
where each clause can be spelled out in different ways, including ways which ultimately refer back to a basic unanalyzable 
concept of  knowledge).  
4  It may seem strange to say that ‘knowledge-yielding communication’ has occurred when knowledge has not been 
acquired. But ‘knowledge-yielding communication’ is merely a label. If  the reader prefers, they may substitute ‘potentially 
knowledge-yielding communication’ as a label for our target concept, and save the label ‘knowledge-yielding 
communication’ for the relation as it occurs in communicative exchanges which actually result in knowledge. This labeling 
convention may, ultimately, be more accurate. However, the convention employed here makes for snappier presentation.   
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Here Petra fails to gain knowledge. However, her failure is not due to any breakdown in communication. 
The conditions for knowledge-yielding communication have been satisfied. Rather, she fails to gain 
knowledge as a result of  Mary’s dishonesty. There are also cases where knowledge-yielding 
communication occurs, but where it is more controversial whether or not knowledge is gained:  
 
CONTROVERSIAL: Mary and Petra are both native English speakers. But they are also 
strangers. They do not have any particular reasons to trust one another. Mary has just been 
watching the World Cup, and wishes to spread the word regarding Belgium’s surprise victory over 
Brazil. So, she approaches Petra in the street and states that ‘Belgium just beat Brazil in the World 
Cup’. Petra hears and understands Mary’s assertion. Moreover, she does not know much about 
football, and so lacks any particular reason to doubt Mary’s claim. So she comes to believe that 
Belgium beat Brazil in the World Cup.  
 
Here it is more controversial whether Petra gains knowledge. If  we are liberal about the conditions for 
testimonial knowledge, holding that audiences have a defeasible default right to accept testimony, then 
we will likely hold that Petra gains knowledge. However, if  we hold that positive reasons of  trust are 
required for testimonial knowledge then we will want to deny this. The important thing to note, 
however, is that even if  knowledge is not gained, this failure is not due to a breakdown in 
communication. If  we hold all the other factors fixed, and simply add that Petra does have good reason 
to trust Mary, then it will be uncontroversial that she gains knowledge. This stands in contrast to cases 
like the following:  
 
MISCOMMUNICATION:   Mary and Petra are both native English speakers. Moreover, they 
are good friends, and have strong reasons to trust one another.  Mary knows that Petra’s friend 
Tom is in town, and she wants to share this knowledge with Petra. So she states to Petra that 
‘Tom is in town’. Petra mishears Mary’s assertion, and takes her to have stated that ‘Tom is a 
clown’. On this basis, she forms the belief  that Tom is a clown.  
 
Here, Petra fails to gain knowledge (even if, as it turns out, Tom is a clown). Yet this failure is not due to 
any dishonesty or unreliability on Mary’s part. And Petra’s belief  is, we may suppose, very well justified. 
She fails to gain knowledge due to a breakdown in communication.  We are concerned in this paper with 
the conditions which are satisfied in GOOD, BAD, and CONTROVERSIAL, but which are not satisfied 
in MISCOMMUNICATION.  
 
This can be thought of  as follows: in typical cases of  testimony, a speaker attempts to represent the 
world in a particular way. There is some proposition which they attempt to represent as true. Likewise, 
the audience will represent the speaker as having, through their assertion, represented the world as being 
a particular way. They will, upon hearing the assertion, enter a state of  apparent comprehension which 
represents the speaker as presenting some proposition as true.5 When they come to believe this 
proposition (and thus, from their perspective at least, accept the speaker’s testimony) they will have 
formed what we may call a “testimonial belief ”.6 
                                                 
5  This state of  comprehension may be the result of  some quasi-inferential process, or it may be a matter of  decoding 
some packaged message. This is a matter with which we need not concern ourselves.  
6   Thus, the type of  belief  we are concerned with relates closely to what Goldberg (2007), following Audi (1997), calls 
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In order for a testimonial belief  to constitute knowledge, various conditions must be satisfied. For 
example, the speaker’s representational intention, and the audience’s representation of  the speaker as 
having presented a particular proposition as true, must be related in the right way. In 
MISCOMMUNICATION these states are not related in the right way. In GOOD, BAD, and 
CONTROVERSIAL, they are related in the right way. There is a question regarding what it is for these 
states to be related in the right way. That is the question which will be addressed in this paper.  
 
The requisite relation might be very strict. For example, it might be held that knowledge-yielding 
communication requires that the interlocutors coordinate on precisely the same fine grained proposition, 
and that it be common knowledge that they have succeeded in doing so. Alternatively, they may be quite 
loose, only requiring, for example, that the interlocutors entertain somewhat similar propositions.  
However this question is settled, we will not come away with a complete epistemology of  testimony. 
Even supposing that the strictest possible conditions on knowledge-yielding communication are 
satisfied, an audience may still fail to gain testimonial knowledge upon forming a testimonial belief. For 
example, we might suppose that in BAD it is mutual knowledge that Mary, through her assertion, 
represents it as being the case that Tom is out of  town. Petra does not gain knowledge in BAD, but this 
failure is due to Mary’s dishonesty. Likewise, we might suppose that it is mutual knowledge in 
CONTROVERSIAL that Mary represented it as being the case that Belgium beat Brazil. Yet there is still 
a question to be asked about whether or not Petra gains knowledge.  
 
Thus, issues such as dishonesty and speaker unreliability, (i.e. the usual subject matter of  the 
epistemology of  testimony) can be theorized about largely in abstraction from issues to do with 
communication itself. We can presuppose perfect knowledgeable coordination between interlocutors, 
and still ask substantive questions about, for example, whether audiences must have reasons to trust a 
speaker in order to gain knowledge. However, suppose we hold fixed all the factors in a case such that, if  
perfect knowledgeable coordination has occurred, it will be uncontroversial that testimonial knowledge 
has been acquired. We can then ask: must perfect knowledgeable coordination occur in order for the 
audience to gain knowledge? Or is some lesser relation sufficient? A complete understanding of  
testimony, and communication more generally, as a source of  knowledge, requires an answer to this 
                                                                                                                                                                    
‘belief  through testimony’. Goldberg and Audi both note that there are cases in which an audience’s belief  that p is somehow 
dependent on a speaker’s testimony, without in any sense being a testimonial belief. For instance, if  a speaker says something 
in English we may, as a result of  our understanding the content of  their utterance, come to learn that they speak English.  
Likewise, if  somebody states that they are a baritone in a baritone voice we can learn that they are a baritone without, in any 
sense, relying on their testimony. This prompts Goldberg to focus on knowledge through testimony, which he defines as 
“knowledge involving reliable belief  in what was attested, formed on the basis of  its having been attested” (Goldberg (2007) 
p 15).  In this paper we are concerned with cases where the audience comes to believe that p on the basis of  their 
representation of  the speaker as having presented p as true. This rules out beliefs like the English speaking or baritone beliefs 
as testimonial. However, it builds in less than the notion of  knowledge through testimony:  knowledge through testimony 
requires that the belief  the audience forms be in a proposition attested to by the speaker. However, it is unclear precisely what 
it is for a speaker to attest to a particular proposition. Moreover, it is an open question, at this point in the investigation, 
whether an audience’s testimonial belief  must be in a proposition attested to, or rather in a proposition in some sense related 
to one attested to by a speaker. It may well be that, given the potentially messy and quasi-inferential nature of  linguistic 
communication, true belief  through testimony is rare. It may be that most so called ‘testimonial knowledge’ merely 
approximates knowledge through testimony. This is an issue which I do not wish to prejudge at this point.  
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question.7  
 
3. The Simple View 
 
The simplest response to QUESTION is to hold that knowledge-yielding communication occurs when a 
speaker performs an assertion intending to communicate some proposition p, and the hearer recovers p, 
where propositions are conceived of  in a coarse grained manner. Unfortunately, such coordination is not 
sufficient for knowledge-yielding communication. An obvious fallback would be to require coordination 
on more fine grained contents. However, as we shall see, there is reason to be skeptical of  such 
approaches. Moreover, we will find that coordination on coarse grained content is also unnecessary for 
knowledge-yielding communication. By examining these failings of  the simple view we are able to 
identify two seemingly conflicting criteria an account of  knowledge-yielding communication must satisfy.  
 
3.1 Simple Sufficiency 
 
The simple view’s failure to provide a plausible sufficient condition on knowledge-yielding 
communication is illustrated by cases like the following (originally introduced by Brian Loar (1976), and 
henceforth referred to as “Loar cases”)): 
 
LOAR: Suppose that Smith and Jones are unaware that the man being interviewed on the 
television is someone they see on the train every morning, and about whom in that latter role, 
they have just been talking. Smith utters 'He is a stockbroker' intending to refer to the man on 
the television; Jones takes Smith to be referring to the man on the train. Now Jones, as it 
happens, has correctly identified Smith’s referent, since the man on the television is the man on 
the train; but he has failed to understand Smith’s utterance. Loar 1976: 357. 
 
If  the content of  “he” is exhausted by its referent then Smith and Jones have the same belief. Thus, on 
the simple view, knowledge-yielding communication will have occurred. Yet Jones does not gain 
testimonial knowledge. Loar, who focused on mutual understanding rather than knowledge-yielding 
communication, concludes that direct reference views must be rejected.  
 
However, Loar’s diagnosis can be questioned. Similar cases can be given in which the interlocutors share 
descriptive modes of  presentation. Consider the following case presented by Byrne and Thau (1996). 
                                                 
7   Our core question should be distinguished from that of  when we communicate well enough to transmit knowledge. 
A speaker transmits their knowledge or justification when, in some robust sense, their knowledge or justification becomes the 
audience’s knowledge or justification. Transmission views are highly controversial (see Lackey (1999), MacFarlane (2005), 
Barnett (2015), Fraser (2016), Peet and Pitcovski (2017), and Leonard (forthcoming) for objections). It is a truism that we 
have a great deal of  testimonial knowledge, so much so that any view of  linguistic communication that predicts otherwise 
should be treated with skepticism. This is not true of  transmission based knowledge. Hence the focus on a broader question 
of  knowledge-yielding communication. Our question should also be distinguished from that of  the general conditions for 
communicative success. Communicative success is a multifaceted notion. For example, it is sometimes thought of  in terms of  
knowledge transmission (Evans (1989), Heck (1995)), the enabling of  successful action (Paul (1999), Carston (2002), 
Bezuidenhout (2002)), rational engagement (Heck 2002), or as an intuitive notion (Pagin (2008), (forthcoming)). These 
distinct notions of  communicative success, I believe, require distinct treatments. Here I focus on what I take to be one of  the 
most important notions of  communicative success: knowledge-yielding communication. Although, as we will see, there are 
lessons to be drawn about other forms of  communicative success (insofar as they also preclude luck). 
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HOSPITAL: A patient checks into hospital and is assigned room 101. Tony dubs him "Winston" 
and the cognitive value she attaches to the name is: the amnesiac in room 101. Alex is thoroughly 
unaware that Tony has seen the patient, but by sheer chance she also dubs him "Winston" and 
attaches the same cognitive value to the name. Alex utters "Winston will never recover" in Tony's 
presence, and Tony forms the belief  she would express by saying "Winston will never recover". 
Byrne and Thau (1996), p 147.  
 
As Byrne and Thau note, the interlocutors share the same content under the same descriptive mode of  
presentation, yet testimonial knowledge is not acquired. Thus, sharing descriptive modes of  presentation 
is also insufficient for knowledge-yielding communication. Indeed, the problem is not restricted to 
referential communication. We can generalize this method of  generating cases by having interlocutors 
luckily coordinate on the meanings of  general terms, quantifiers, connectives, or operators. The obvious 
lesson to draw from these cases is that, firstly, the sharing of  coarse grained contents is not sufficient for 
knowledge-yielding communication, as such coordination can occur as a matter of  luck, and secondly 
that it is not clear the problem can be resolved by adding sense or structure to the thoughts entertained.8 
The inconsistency of  knowledge-yielding communication with luck should come as no surprise, as 
knowledge precludes luck.9 A satisfactory account of  knowledge-yielding communication must capture 
this. 
 
3.2 Simple Necessity 
 
We should also be skeptical of  the necessity of  precise coordination for knowledge-yielding 
communication. Several otherwise plausible pictures of  communication and mental content seem to 
imply that interlocutors rarely coordinate even on coarse grained propositions.10 If  any of  these views 
are correct then the simple view sanctions a widespread skepticism about testimonial knowledge. 
Moreover, it seems antecedently plausible that, within certain bounds, communication is often 
                                                 
8  There are alternative views of  sense against which Byrn and Thau’s example has less force. For example, if  we deny 
that the aboutness properties of  Tony and Alex’s “Winston” beliefs are explained by reference to the description they attach 
to the name, and identify senses with explanations of  the aboutness properties of  token thoughts (in a manner somewhat 
akin to Evans (1982)), then we can deny that they each think of  Winston under the same mode of  presentation. The 
important point is that, as things stand, Loar cases have little dialectical force against the direct reference theorist. In order for 
these cases to have force it needs to be established that the elimination of  luck requires coordination on senses (of  some 
sort). At this point this has not been shown. We will return to this point in §5.2 when it will be argued that, in order for 
communicative luck to be eliminated there must be a robust explanation for the relational fact that the interlocutors’ token 
thoughts share certain aboutness properties. This provides some support for the Fregean thought that communication 
requires thinking of  referents in suitably related ways, although it does not (by itself) require us to build modes of  
presentation into the contents of  the interlocutors’ thoughts.  
9  It might be objected that in HOSPITAL the interlocutors are not justified in taking their usage to be shared. 
However, it can easily be modified to account for this. We need merely adjust the case such that each interlocutor has a 
gettiered belief  that their meaning is shared. 
10  For example, the radical contextualism of  Sperber and Wilson (1986), Bezuidenhout (1997), and Carston (2002).  It 
is also often acknowledged that coordination on finer grained contents is not necessary for successful communication. This 
claim is held by some fregeans such as Bezuidenhout (1997) and Heck (2002), and several approaches to indexical content 
(See Weber (2016) for an overview)). I will focus on coarse grained contents, as the failure of  coarse grained coordination 
implies failures of  fine grained coordination.  
 . 
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approximate and loose. If  coordination is typically approximate, yet knowledge-yielding communication 
requires precision, then knowledge-yielding communication will be rare.  
 
Still, this may simply be taken as evidence that communication is typically precise. So I will outline two 
cases in which an audience forms a non-lucky non-deviant true belief  despite failing to coordinate 
precisely with the speaker. Such cases suggest that exact coordination on coarse grained content is not 
required for knowledge-yielding communication. Consider the following: 
 
HEIGHT: Branden and Emily are discussing Michael Jordan’s height. Branden says ‘Michael 
Jordan is tall’. As it happens Branden and Emily assign slightly different meanings to the word 
‘tall’. For Branden ‘tall’ means ‘over 1.8 meters’, for Emily it means ‘over 1.7999999999999999 
meters’. So the proposition Emily believes differs from the proposition Branden intends. Still, 
since Michael Jordan is actually 1.98 meters tall Emily’s belief  could not easily have been false. 
The world would have to have been very different for her belief  to have been false. Moreover, 
Branden would not make his assertion in these worlds, as Michael Jordan is not over 1.8 meters 
tall in these worlds. Thus, it seems that Emily comes to know that Michael Jordan is over 
1.7999999999999999 meters in height.11 
 
There are two worries one might have about HEIGHT. Firstly, one might worry that no realistic agent 
would assign ‘tall’ such a precise extension. This is correct. But it is not clear that this observation can 
vindicate the simple view. We could, for example, modify the case such that Branden and Emily’s uses of  
‘tall’ are indeterminate over slightly different ranges of  heights meaning that, at some point, an agent can 
count as determinately tall for Emily and not for Branden. Such a case would not involve precise 
coordination.12 Yet, if  Michael Jordan is safely within the range of  “tall” for both Branden and Emily 
knowledge-yielding communication still occurs. Secondly, one might object on externalist grounds, 
holding that ‘tall’ has its extension fixed in the same way for both Branden and Emily by factors beyond 
their ken. However, it doesn’t follow from the core tenants of  externalism that ‘tall’ cannot have a 
slightly different extension for Emily and Branden. For example, it may be that Emily and Branden are 
from related but separate linguistic communities which, despite having marginally different patterns of  
use for the term ‘tall’, can interact as if  they speak the same language. Such a situation is possible, and 
seems consistent with Emily gaining knowledge. 
 
HEIGHT illustrates that very slight differences in meaning are compatible with knowledge-yielding 
communication. However, it is worth noting that, in the right conditions, more radical divergence in 
meaning can also be compatible with knowledge-yielding communication: 
 
BEER: Sam and Marie have organized a party for which they are supplying beer. Some guests 
                                                 
11 The exact meanings assigned by the interlocutors in this case are not essential. In particular we can swap the meanings 
assigned and gain the same result (as long as we suppose that in the reversed case Branden would, to avoid risk, not 
predicate tallness of  agents who only just count as tall for him). The important fact is that the object of  the predication 
(Michael Jordan) falls safely outside of  the margin for error for both interlocutors’ uses of  “tall”. As a result, Emily’s 
belief  is rendered safe.  
12 It is not clear in general how introducing indeterminacy makes coordination easier. Indeed, on some ways of  modeling 
indeterminacy (for example in terms of  fuzzy meanings) indeterminacy makes precise coordination even harder 
(MacFarlane (2016)).  
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have also brought their own beer. Sam has to leave before the party begins, and returns once it is 
in full swing. Most of  the guests have been sharing their own beer and drinking the beer 
provided. Sam, upon arrival, approaches Marie and Molly (a guest). He asks them “is there any 
beer left?” He is interested in whether or not there is any beer at the party –beer he can drink. 
However, Marie interprets him as asking whether any of  the beer they purchased remains. She 
answers “no, there isn’t any beer left”, intending to communicate that the beer they purchased 
has all been consumed. Sam forms the belief  that all the beer at the party has been consumed. 
As it happens, his belief  is true. The beer brought by the guests has also been consumed. Molly 
knows this. She is aware that the guests have been sharing beer, and that Marie and Sam might 
have their wires crossed. If  there was any guest beer left Molly would correct Marie, and let Sam 
know that there is some remaining beer. However, she says nothing, as she knows that whichever 
proposition Sam recovered was true. 
 
If  it wasn’t for Molly Sam would not have gained testimonial knowledge. Marie would have asserted 
“there isn’t any beer left” even if  there was some guest beer, in which case Sam would have formed a 
false belief. This easily could have happened. However, Molly’s presence as a member of  the group 
addressed by Sam removes this risk of  error. Because of  her presence, and her dispositions to correct 
Marie, Sam could not easily have formed a false belief. The element of  luck is eliminated. Moreover, 
Sam’s belief  is justified, and there does not seem to be anything deviant about the manner in which it is 
true. He acquires a true belief  as a result of  Marie’s sincere testimony, his own normally functioning 
system of  comprehension, and Molly’s disposition to discharge her discursive responsibilities as a party 
to the discussion.13 So we should conclude that Sam does gain knowledge, and that the simple view is 
false.14 
 
Together, HEIGHT and BEER illustrate that precise coordination is not required for knowledge-
yielding communication. If  interlocutors entertain similar enough propositions, or the social 
environment is sufficiently accommodating, knowledge-yielding communication can occur despite 
divergence in interpretation. This creates a puzzle: In §3.1 we observed that precise coordination was not 
sufficient for knowledge-yielding communication. Something more, such as knowledge of  successful 
coordination, is needed to rule out communicative luck.15 However, the observations in §3.2 pull us in 
                                                 
13 That interlocutors have such discursive responsibilities is illustrated by the fact that we will generally hold others 
responsible for failing to correct harmful misunderstandings or false testimony if  they are easily able to do so. For an 
extended discussion of  the duty to object to misleading testimony see Lackey (forthcoming). 
14 One might object as follows: If  asked why he believed that all the beer at the party had been consumed Sam would 
respond “Marie told me so”. However, this is not what Marie intended to tell him. Thus, his belief  is based on a 
falsehood. This objection faces several problems (besides presupposing the impossibility of  knowledge from falsehood). 
Firstly, the question under discussion was that of  whether there was any beer left at the party. Marie simply fails to realize 
this. Insofar was what is said is determined by the question under discussion (Schoubye and Stokke (2016)), or similar 
factors such as reasonable interpretation, we should say that Marie did (accidentally) assert that there isn’t any beer at the 
party. Thus, we can maintain that Sam’s report is accurate. Moreover, Sam is providing a retrospective rationalization of  
his belief. The actual process by which he formed his belief  took place largely at the subpersonal level: Marie uttered the 
sentence “there isn’t any beer left”, Sam perceived her utterance, and the sub-personal cogs of  interpretation started 
turning. The output of  this process was a representation of  the party as lacking beer. Sam’s belief  state was automatically 
updated with this representation (since he possessed no defeaters). It is the actual process of  belief  formation, not the 
retrospective rationalization, which matters for knowledge. And this process, embedded in this environment, produced a 
justified and safe true belief. Thus, Sam gains knowledge. 
15 Similarly, Loar cases have been used to motivate the need for knowledge of  truth conditions (Heck (1995)), or knowledge 
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the opposite direction. The simple view is unable to capture the consistency of  imprecision with 
knowledge-yielding communication. In HEIGHT and BEER knowledge of  successful coordination 
failed for the basic reason that the interlocutors did not coordinate successfully. Thus, the simple view is 
at once overly demanding and insufficiently demanding. A satisfactory approach to knowledge-yielding 
communication will resolve the apparent tension between its inconsistency with luck, and its toleration 
of  imprecision.  
 
4. Similar Propositions 
 
Before moving on to the positive proposal it is worth briefly considering an obvious weakening of  the 
simple view, which may be thought capable of  solving the problem of  imprecision. According to this 
weakened version of  the simple view knowledge-yielding communication requires only that interlocutors 
entertain relevantly similar propositions (a similar stance is taken with respect to communicative success 
by Bezuidenhout (1997), and Carston (2002)).  
 
In light of  the preceding discussion it should be clear that content similarity will not suffice for 
knowledge-yielding communication. Loar cases demonstrate that exact similarity is consistent with 
communicative luck. Moreover, BEER illustrates that the social environment of  an exchange can affect 
whether knowledge-yielding communication occurs. So no content relation by itself  will be sufficient.16  
 
However, as a necessary condition for knowledge-yielding communication a similarity requirement 
seems plausible. If  two interlocutors assign completely different and unrelated meanings to one 
another’s utterances then, it might be thought, their exchanges will not support the acquisition of  
knowledge (certainly not knowledge that can be labeled “testimonial” without stretching the concept 
beyond its limits). At the very least, a plausible approach to knowledge-yielding communication should 
explain the appeal of  content similarity conditions, since they are accepted by so many theorists as a 
condition on communicative success. The main problem is that simply postulating a similarity 
requirement in this context is uninformative. It is not clear what dimensions or degrees of  similarity 
would be necessary for knowledge-yielding communication.17 A satisfactory approach should, if  it is to 
capture the widespread intuition that successful communication requires at least some level of  
coordination between interlocutors, rule out cases in which interlocutors assign completely unrelated 
meanings to one another’s utterances. However, if  the account is to be interesting and informative it 
should do so without explicit appeal to the notion of  content similarity, as the relevant similarity relation 
is an important part of  what we need to account for.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
of  co-reference (Onofri (forthcoming)), for successful communication. There are independent reasons to be skeptical of  
such approaches. For example, Hawthorne and Manley (2012) provide reasons to doubt that knowledge of  reference is 
required. And Peet (2018) argues for the possibility of  testimonial knowledge without knowledge of  what is said. 
16 Note that if  Molly was absent in BEER knowledge-yielding communication would not have occurred. Yet the 
propositions entertained would be equally similar along all the relevant dimensions to the propositions entertained in 
BEER. 
17 Indeed, as an anonymous referee points out, since we are not strictly concerned with knowledge through testimony it is 
unclear what principled reason there could be for maintaining a similarity requirement at all. I am sympathetic to this 
concern, and my final account makes no mention of  content similarity. However, it is predicted by my positive account 
that, as it happens, knowledge-yielding communication will be vanishingly rare or impossible in cases where interlocutors 
entertain unrelated contents. This explains the common intuition that successful communication requires content 
similarity. 
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5. Communicative Luck 
 
The preceding discussion has provided us with several criteria a theory of  knowledge-yielding 
communication must satisfy. A satisfactory approach will rule out communicative luck. It will allow for 
slight variation in meaning, whilst ruling out radical variation in meaning. And it will be allow for the 
social environment of  an exchange to affect whether knowledge-yielding communication has occurred.  
 
Knowledge-yielding communication was introduced as the minimal relation which obtains either when a 
communicative exchange results in the acquisition of  knowledge, or when an audience’s failure to 
acquire knowledge is due to some factor independent of  the communicative exchange itself  (e.g. the 
speaker’s dishonesty). We can thus develop a promising account of  knowledge-yielding communication 
by considering the conditions under which a feature of  the communicative exchange itself  may prevent 
the audience from gaining knowledge. The result is a view of  knowledge-yielding communication 
modeled on knowledge itself. 
 
An agent knows that p, roughly, when they have a non-lucky non-deviant true belief  that p (where 
“deviantly formed belief ” is taken to include unjustified belief  and belief  which is rendered true or safe 
in the wrong way). Thus, in order for knowledge-yielding communication to fail the communicative 
exchange must be such as to render any belief  it produces false, lucky, or deviant. The only way for the 
communicative exchange itself  to render the audience’s belief  false would be for the speaker and hearer 
to entertain propositions with different truth values (otherwise the speaker’s unreliability will explain the 
inability of  the audience to gain knowledge). That is, we are considering the way in which the speaker’s 
representational intention, and the audience’s representation of  the speaker as having presented a 
particular proposition as true, must be related in order for the audience to gain knowledge. The only way 
a defect in this relation could explain the audience’s false belief  would be for it to prevent coordination 
on truth values. If  the hearer forms a false belief  when there is successful coordination on truth values, 
then the speaker must intend a false proposition (either through dishonesty or incompetence). But in 
this case the salient explanation for the audience’s false belief  will be the speaker’s defective intention. 
Even if  the interlocutors had coordinated perfectly the audience would have still formed a false belief.  
Likewise, the only way for the communicative exchange to render the audience’s belief  lucky or deviant 
would be for the coordination to occur deviantly or as a matter of  luck. This suggests that knowledge-
yielding communication is simply non-lucky non-deviant coordination on truth values.  
 
By treating knowledge-yielding communication as non-lucky non-deviant coordination on truth values 
we are able to satisfy the criteria outlined above. I will focus here on the notion of  communicative luck, 
as this notion alone is able to do most of  the relevant work. I will return to the issue of  deviant 
communication in §6. The basic anti-luck approach is as follows: 
 
BASIC LUCK : In cases of  knowledge-yielding communication 1) a speaker attempts to 
communicate some proposition,18 and an audience understands the speaker to be communicating 
                                                 
18 For my purposes it does not matter how we individuate propositions. They can be thought of  as coarse grained entities 
representable as sets of  possible worlds, or more fine grained structured entities.  
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some proposition,19 2) the interlocutors have representational states with identical truth values, 3) 
it is not a matter of  luck that (2) is satisfied.20  
 
Condition (2) requires some explanation. On the rough picture of  communication I am presupposing a 
speaker has a communicative intention, which is representational in the sense that it attaches to some 
proposition – the object of  their intention. The hearer then represents the speaker as having asserted 
some proposition. In doing so they have a representational state corresponding to the perceived content 
of  the assertion.21 These are the representational states at issue in (2). For them to correspond in truth 
value is for the propositional content of  each state to correspond in truth value.  
 
It is clear that BASIC LUCK deals with the issue of  communicative luck. However, it is less clear how it 
helps us with our other criteria. In particular, BASIC LUCK seems to allow for knowledge-yielding 
communication in cases where the interlocutors entertain completely unrelated propositions. I will argue 
that, when properly understood, (3) cannot be satisfied in such cases. If  the propositions entertained by 
the speaker and hearer are not related in the right way then it will be a matter of  luck that their 
representational states correspond in truth value. In order to see this we must unpack the relevant notion 
of  luck.22 
 
5.1. Modal Instability 
 
The characteristic feature of  lucky events is a feeling of  instability - a lack of  secure foundation. Lucky 
events seem to float free from the world of  expectation, explanation, and prediction. It is the task of  a 
theory of  luck to account for this felt instability in a precise way. The modal view developed by Pritchard 
(2005) is currently the most influential approach to luck. It is, thus, a natural starting point. Pritchard 
gives the following as a condition on luck: 
 
MAL: If  an event is lucky, then it is an event that occurs in the actual world but which does not 
occur in a wide class of  the nearest possible worlds where the relevant initial conditions for that 
                                                 
19 I wish to remain neutral on what it takes for a hearer to understand a speaker to be asserting a proposition p. It may 
involve believing that the speaker intended to communicate p, or perhaps a perception like experience of  the speaker as 
having said p. It does seem clear that neither the audience’s interpretation nor the speaker’s framing of  their assertion can 
be unjustified or irrational if  the exchange is to result in knowledge. Providing an account of  the justification of  
interpretation and speech is part of  the project of  explicating the notion of  non-deviant coordination. If  the speaker’s 
framing of  their assertion or the hearer’s interpretation is unjustified then, if  they nonetheless coordinate, they will have 
done so in a deviant way. See §6 for some brief  comments on the non-deviance condition. A full account of  the 
rationality of  communication requires a more extended treatment than can be provided here. 
20 BASIC LUCK allows that knowledge-yielding communication is prevented in cases where the interlocutors coordinate on 
truth values, but easily could have failed to do so by entertaining different propositions in relevantly similar situations. It 
also rules out knowledge-yielding communication in cases where the actual propositions entertained only correspond in 
truth value as a matter of  luck. However, it allows for knowledge-yielding communication in cases where the interlocutors 
entertain false propositions. In such cases, assuming the coordination on truth values is not lucky, it will be the falsity of  
the recovered proposition, not some communicative defect, which prevents knowledge acquisition. 
21 It may be that hearers typically entertain several propositions, either simultaneously or in sequence before settling on a 
final interpretation. If  there is a significant duration during which one misinterpretation persists before being corrected 
we might say that knowledge-yielding communication has failed to occur until the final interpretation has been reached. 
22 Although I will be drawing on proposed analyses of  luck I don’t claim that luck is ultimately analyzable. Even if  luck is 
unanalyzable, attempts at analysis are useful in that they illuminate the structure of  certain forms of  luck.  
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event are the same as in the actual world. 
Pritchard 2005: 125. 
 
This condition captures the notion that lucky events easily could have failed to occur. The sense of  
instability is captured in terms of  modal instability: lucky events do not occur in a stable manner within 
the relevant sector of  modal space. We can develop an approach to knowledge-yielding communication 
based on the modal account of  luck as follows:  
 
MODAL LUCK: In cases of  knowledge-yielding communication 1) a speaker attempts to 
communicate some proposition, and an audience understands the speaker to be communicating 
some proposition, 2) the interlocutors have representational states with identical truth values, 3) 
it could not easily have been the case that (2) fail to be satisfied.2324  
 
MODAL LUCK has some initial promise. For example, in BEER Molly’s presence and dispositions 
guaranteed Marie and Sam’s coordination on truth values in all nearby worlds. If  Molly was absent then 
there would have been nearby worlds in which Sam and Marie failed to coordinate on truth values. It 
also straightforwardly handles HEIGHT. 
 
Unfortunately, this simple modal account faces two major problems. Firstly, it appears to allow for 
knowledge-yielding communication in cases in which interlocutors entertain completely unrelated 
propositions. As long as the propositions entertained are true at all nearby worlds then MODAL LUCK 
will be satisfied. This is an unacceptable result. 
This problem is not, by itself, damning for the modal approach. Standard modal approaches to epistemic 
luck do not hold merely that an agent’s belief  is lucky if  it could easily have been false. They hold that a 
belief  is lucky if  the agent could easily have formed a relevantly similar false belief  via the same 
method.25 This modification is essential if  such views are to make the correct predictions about cases 
such as the following.  
CALCULATOR: Ben is using a malfunctioning calculator. The answers it provides are random. 
He instructs it to calculate 1867 + 8946 and, by chance, it spits out 10813 (the correct answer). 
Ben comes to believe, on the basis of  this, that 1867 + 8946 = 10813. 
Ben’s belief  is correct. But we do not want to label it knowledge. It seems clear that he believes truly 
only as a matter of  luck. Yet, his actual belief  is true in all nearby worlds. It is only by factoring in similar 
                                                 
23 When assessing the truth of  (3) it is important to hold (1) fixed across all the worlds considered. Otherwise we get 
communicative luck when some event could easily have occurred which would have prevented the communicative 
exchange from taking place.  
24 The modal account bears similarities to an approach to communicative success with general terms developed by Pagin 
(forthcoming) according to which such success requires that the intended and recovered propositions be such that they 
could not easily have differed in truth value. This is not quite the same as MODAL LUCK since it allows for the requisite 
form of  success to occur as a matter of  luck. For example, it would allow for lucky communicative success in Loar cases 
(with general terms). This is due to its formulation in terms of  the propositions believed, rather than the representational 
states of  the agents (which could have different propositions as objects in nearby worlds). 
25 Views along these lines are provided by Williamson (2000), Manley (2007), and Pritchard (2007). 
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situations in which the same method is employed (i.e. using the defective calculator), but a different 
belief  is formed, that we are able to secure the result that his belief  is luckily true.  
A similar move can be made with respect to MODAL LUCK. If  a speaker and hearer assign vastly 
different meanings to the same term then, even if  they happen to coordinate on truth values in their 
actual exchange, they will fail to do so in relevantly similar exchanges. For example, suppose Pete gets 
confused between France and Poland. Sue tells Pete that Germany invaded France during the Second 
World War. Pete takes Sue to be telling him that Germany invaded Poland during the Second World War. 
Both propositions are true. And we may suppose that they are each true in all nearby worlds. However, 
Pete’s belief  still seems lucky. We can explain this as follows: given this mismatch in meaning assignment 
Pete and Sue would fail to coordinate on truth values in many similar situations. For example, if  Sue told 
Pete that France was liberated by the Allies in 1944 then Pete would come to believe that Poland was 
liberated by the Allies in 1944. This is false. Thus, they would fail to coordinate on truth values. In light 
of  this we should interpret the modal condition as failing whenever there are nearby cases in which 
some aspect of  the linguistic or interpretative basis for the speaker’s framing of  their utterance or the 
audience's interpretation of  the utterance remains fixed, and results in a failure of  coordination on truth 
values. The basic thought here is as follows: safety theories of  knowledge hold that, if  an agent easily 
could have formed a false belief, given the method employed, then it will be a matter of  luck if  they 
believe truly. Likewise, if  the interpretative basis for an exchange easily could have led to a failure of  
coordination, then any actual coordination will be lucky.  
The second problem with MODAL LUCK is less easily treated: there are Loar cases which satisfy 
MODAL LUCK. Consider the following case presented by Peet (2017):  
 
LOAR 2: Smith and Jones are unaware that the man being interviewed on television is someone 
they see on the train every morning. Smith says 'He is a stockbroker', intending to refer to the 
man on television; Jones recognizes that Smith is drawing upon their common knowledge that 
there is a salient man on the television screen, but seeing the similarity between the man on the 
television and the man they often see on the train he thinks that Smith, who he assumes also 
recognizes the similarity, is talking about the man they see on the train. Now Jones, as it happens, 
has correctly identified Smith's referent, since the man on television is the man on the train; but 
he has failed to understand Smith's utterance. 
Peet, 2017, 381. 
 
Conditions one and two are satisfied: Smith and Jones are both rational and entertain true propositions. 
Condition three is also satisfied: We can imagine that Smith’s intention is stable - he could not easily have 
intended a different proposition. Moreover, if  Jones had not noticed a similarity between the man on the 
train and the man on the TV he would not have taken Jones to be talking about the man on the train. 
The next best referent is the man on the TV, so he would have correctly taken Jones to be talking about 
the man on the TV. Thus, in the nearest worlds where he interpreted Smith differently he would have 
recovered a proposition with the same truth value. Yet, the proposition he does recover necessarily has 
the same truth conditions as the proposition Jones intended. On direct reference views it is simply the 
same proposition. And most Fregeans take singular terms to be rigid designators, so the mode of  
presentation under which the referent is entertained will determine the same individual in all worlds. 
Thus, there are no nearby worlds in which Smith and Jones have representational states which differ in 
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truth value, and it is not obvious that any aspect of  the basis for either Smith’s framing of  his assertion, 
or Jones’s interpretation of  his assertion, could easily have resulted in coordination failure in similar 
cases.26 
 
This problem is not new. It is a version of  a familiar problem, which was originally pressed by Lackey 
(2008) as an objection to Pritchard’s modal account of  luck. The problem is that there can be modally 
stable lucky events. Consider the following case (paraphrased from Lackey (2008, p 261)): 
 
BURIED TREASURE: Sophie plans to bury all her treasure. Her criteria for the burial spot are, 
for sentimental reasons, that it be on the northwest corner of  her island, and that it be a spot 
where rose bushes can flourish. There is only one spot which satisfies these criteria. So, she 
buries her treasure there.  
 
One month later Vincent is looking for a place to plant a rose bush in memory of  his deceased 
mother who loved both roses and the northwest corner of  the island. He quickly locates the only 
patch of  land on the northwest corner of  the island where rose bushes can flourish. He begins 
digging and discovers Sophie’s buried treasure. 
 
Vincent is lucky to find the treasure. However, he finds it in the majority of  nearby worlds in which he 
plants a rose bush. Thus, modal stability within the sphere of  nearby worlds is not sufficient for the 
elimination of  luck.27  
 
5.2. Mere Coincidence 
 
As previously noted, lucky events exhibit a form of  instability: a lack secure foundations or robust 
explanation. The modal account of  luck, by focusing on modal instability, goes a long way toward 
capturing this sense of  instability. What Lackey’s case makes salient is that modal instability is not the 
only form of  luck generating instability. To make progress we must identify the form of  instability which 
occurs in BURIED TREASURE. This is not hard to do: a core feature of  BURIED TREASURE is that 
Vincent’s digging up the treasure is explained by a coincidence: The fact that he and Sophie both plan to 
plant rose bushes.28  
 
                                                 
26 The Fregean could avoid this issue by denying that names rigidly designate. However, Jones will still form the following 
actualized belief  alongside his non-actualized belief: the actual person we see on the train every day is a stockbroker. The 
same puzzle can be generated with respect to this belief, which is plausibly communication based (Blome-Tillmann (2017) 
observes that we can generalize standard Gettier cases in a similar way to generate problems for simple modal anti-luck 
conditions on knowledge).  
27 As an anonymous referee points out, not everyone shares the intuition that Vincent’s discovery is lucky. Pritchard (2014), 
for example, holds that it is merely accidental. This does not undermine the point I am making in this paper however. The 
important point is that there is some luck-like instability in the event. Such instability is incompatible with knowledge: if  it 
is a mere accident that a belief  is true then it does not constitute knowledge. If  one were to double down and hold that a 
belief  constitutes knowledge whenever it is non-deviant and non-lucky in the modal sense, allowing for accidentally true 
beliefs to constitute knowledge, then there is little basis for denying that knowledge-yielding communication occurs in 
LOAR 2. Anybody who goes this way can embrace the simpler modal version of  my account.  
28 Broncano-Berrocal (forthcoming) provides a similar counter example to Pritchard’s modal account of  luck and is explicit 
about the role coincidences play in such cases. 
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Coincidences involve two events corresponding (or, ‘coinciding’) in a particular way. For example, two 
acquaintances being in the same place at the same time, or two matching numbered balls being picked 
from an urn. However, not all correspondences are mere coincidences. For example, if  two matching 
balls are picked because the agent was looking for matching balls, and could see the numbers, then the 
correspondence would be no mere coincidence. The distinguishing feature of  mere coincidences is that 
they do not admit of  robust explanation. This resistance to robust explanation captures the feeling of  
instability mere coincidences generate. Moreover, the explanatory instability exhibited by coincidence is, 
as illustrated by BURIED TREASURE, consistent with modal stability.   
 
Traditionally, the resistance of  mere coincidences to robust explanation has been explicated in terms of  
coincidental events lacking a common cause (Owens (1992)). However, as Lando (2017) shows, the 
common cause approach is flawed. She provides the following case:  
 
PIANOS: A boy is playing with a ball in the courtyard of  an apartment complex. He throws the 
ball too high, and it bounces off  of  the balcony of  one apartment, sails through the air, bounces 
onto the balcony of  another apartment, and finally falls to the ground. On each of  the two 
balconies sits a grand piano. As the ball lands on the first balcony it strikes a note on the first 
piano, and as the ball lands on the second balcony, it strikes a note on the second piano. On each 
of  the two pianos, the note struck is the high A. 
Lando, 2017, 135.  
 
The fact that the ball struck the same note on each piano is a mere coincidence. However, the boy’s 
throw is a common cause of  the ball’s striking the high A on each piano. Moreover, the event of  the 
striking of  the first A is a cause of  the striking of  the second A. Thus, coincidental events can have 
common causes, and can be causes of  one another. 
 
Lando’s diagnosis is as follows: In cases of  mere coincidence two events exhibit a particular relationship: 
they correspond in a particular way. We are able to explain the individual features of  each event in a 
robust way. However, there is more to explaining a relational fact than simply explaining the relata. We 
must explain why the facts are related in the way they are. That is, we must explain the relation itself. 
This is the type of  explanation which is lacking in cases of  mere coincidence.29 
 
In PIANOS the striking of  the first key, and the striking of  the second key exhibit the following 
correspondence: the same note was struck on each keyboard. We can explain each event individually: we 
can explain why the ball hit the first high A, and we can explain why it hit the second high A. However, 
we cannot explain the relational fact that the ball hit the same note on each piano. The fact that the first 
                                                 
29 As an anonymous referee points out, it could be maintained that we have, in some sense, explained the relational fact once 
we have explained the relata. This worry is considered by Lando. She points out that it is that it may be OK to say that, in 
some sense, we have explained the relational fact by explaining the individual relata and conjoining them. The important 
point is that mere coincidences are distinguished from non-coincidences by the type of  explanation we are able to give. In 
cases of  mere coincidence we are stuck explaining the individual events and conjoining the explanations. In non-
coincidental (or, non-merely coincidental) cases we can provide an independent explanation for the relational fact. We can 
explain the relational fact without simply stating and conjoining the explanations for the individual relata. The latter form 
of  explanation is robust in a way in which the former is not. And it is the lack of  such explanation which renders a 
correspondence merely coincidental (this issue is also discussed by Gamester (2018), who offers a similar solution).  
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note struck was a high A is independent of  the fact that the second note struck was a high A (and vice 
versa). Thus, the ball’s hitting the same note on each piano is a mere coincidence.  
 
It follows from Lando’s account that coincidences can be modally stable: Suppose A and B are events 
which display a correspondence (such as each involving the same note being hit on a piano, or two 
matching balls being picked from an urn). Each event will have its own explanation. Suppose there are 
no nearby worlds in which the facts which explain A fail to obtain. And suppose the same is true of  B. 
Then, even if  there is no independent explanation for the relevant relational fact (e.g. that the same note 
was struck), the coincidence will occur in all nearby worlds. This allows us to provide a more complete 
diagnosis of  both BURIED TREASURE and LOAR 2.  
Vincent’s discovery was lucky because it was partly explained by a coincidence: the fact that he and 
Sophie both decided to dig in a place where rose bushes would flourish. These decisions were not 
related in the right way. The fact that Vincent decided to dig in a location where rose bushes could 
flourish had nothing to do with the fact that Sophie decided to dig at such a location (and vice versa). 
This captures the feeling of  instability we have regarding the case. Vincent’s discovery of  the treasure is 
unstable because, in an important sense, it lacks a robust explanation.  
 
In LOAR 2 it is a matter of  luck that Smith and Jones coordinate on truth values. Yet they do so in most 
nearby worlds. Their coordination is lucky because it is explained, in part, by a coincidence. It is true that 
Smith’s thought is a partial cause of  Jones’s thought. Indeed, Smith’s thought plays a role in explaining 
Jones’s thought. The coincidence lies elsewhere: in the fact that each token thought refers to the same 
individual. The distinction between explaining the occurrence of  a token thought and explaining its 
aboutness properties is important. If  I see something cute it may cause me to have a thought about my 
son. My attention to the cute object plays a role in explaining my having a thought about my son. 
However, it plays no role in explaining the aboutness properties of  my token thought. It is controversial 
what does explain the aboutness properties of  my thought. The reference may be fixed, for example, by 
a description, an acquaintance relation, or some causal relation between a mental file and my son. But 
the explanation will not involve the cute object. 
 
Smith’s thought refers as a result, in some way, of  his attention to the man on the TV. The reference 
might be fixed, for example, by a description (such as “the man on the TV”), his direct perceptual 
acquaintance with the individual, or some causal relation between a mental file and the man on the TV. 
Jones is also paying attention to the man on the television, and this attention plays a role in causing his 
belief. However, his attention to the man on the television does not play a role in determining the 
referent of  his thought. Rather, his attention to the man on the television causes him to direct his 
attention elsewhere, toward the man on the train. It will be controversial what fixes the referent of  
Jones’s thought. It may be fixed by some description such as “the man on the train”, some memory 
based acquaintance relation, or some causal relation between the apparent stock broker and a mental file. 
Whatever story we give, the aboutness properties of  Smith and Jones’s token thoughts are explanatorily 
independent. We cannot provide a robust explanation the relational fact that Smith and Jones’s token 
thoughts refer to the same individual. At best we can conjoin the individual explanations of  the 
aboutness properties of  each thought.  
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To understand this better it is helpful to consider a contrasting example: A case in which it is no 
coincidence that the aboutness properties of  two thoughts match. It is hard to give such an example 
whilst remaining neutral on matters of  metasemantics, but consider the following example under the 
supposition that the aboutness properties of  thoughts involving names are fixed by chains of  deference 
originating in an initial baptism:  
 
CHARLIE: Suppose Smith and Jones have a friend in common: Charlie. Charlie just got a 
promotion, and Smith wants to communicate this to Jones. So he says ‘Charlie just got a 
promotion’. Jones then forms the belief  that Charlie just got a promotion.  
It is because Smith and Jones’s uses of  the word ‘Charlie’ have their origins in the same chain of  use and 
deference, starting with an initial baptism, that their token ‘Charlie’ thoughts are about the same 
individual. To explain the relational fact that they have a thought about the same individual we do not 
need to give separate explanations of  the aboutness properties of  each token thought and conjoin them. 
We can explain this relational fact by pointing out that their uses of  ‘Charlie’ are related in this way: their 
thoughts have the same aboutness properties because they result from the same chain of  use. This 
stands in contrast to LOAR 2, where we cannot provide an independent explanation of  the aboutness 
properties of  Smith and Jones’s token thoughts.  
As mentioned in footnote eight, this provides a partial vindication of  the Fregean thought that 
communicative success requires that the interlocutors’ thoughts refer in suitably related ways. However, 
we do not need to build anything into the semantics of  singular terms to explain the breakdown in 
communication. The explanation is given at the level of  meta-semantics, and is consistent with coarse 
grained views of  content.30  
 
At this point one might wonder whether we can give an account of  communicative luck purely in terms 
of  coincidence. I am not optimistic. Just as luck generating instability seems to outstrip modal instability, 
it also seems to outstrip explanatory instability. Imagine a version of  BEER where Molly is not present. 
Sam’s belief  would be luckily true. However, it is not clear that the correspondence in truth value 
between Sam and Marie’s representational states would be a mere coincidence. After all, the truth of  
Marie’s intended proposition partly explains the truth of  the proposition Sam comes to believe.  Marie 
intended to communicate that all the beer they had purchased had been consumed. Sam took her to be 
saying that all the beer at the party had been consumed. Each proposition was true, and the latter was 
partially dependent on the former. That is, it could not have been true without the former also being 
true. Moreover, the former significantly raises the probability of  the latter. And any complete 
explanation of  the latter truth will necessarily include an explanation of  the former.  Moreover, we 
cannot appeal to meta-semantic coincidence. Sam and Marie both entertain different propositions, they 
do not co-refer, and they are not intensionally equivalent. The only respect in which they directly 
correspond is in truth value. Thus, it does not seem that we can jettison the modal component of  our 
anti-luck condition. Rather, we must add a “no coincidence” clause:  
 
HYBRID LUCK: In cases of  knowledge-yielding communication 1) a speaker attempts to 
                                                 
30 I have presented the anti-luck approach as a helping with Loar cases only insofar as they are a problem for knowledge-
yielding communication. However, I believe the solution extends to other forms of  communicative success insofar as 
such successes constitute achievements, and achievements in general preclude luck.  
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communicate some proposition, and an audience understands the speaker to be communicating 
some proposition, 2) the interlocutors have representational states with identical truth values, 3) 
it could not easily have been the case that (2) fail to be satisfied, 4) (2) is not satisfied in virtue of  
a mere coincidence. 
  
Building in the notion of  coincidence also has a second advantage: it provides us with an additional 
restriction on meaning mismatch between speaker and hearer. For HYBRID LUCK to be satisfied it will 
usually be required that the correspondence in truth value between p and q be non-coincidental. Their 
truth values will need to be explanatorily connected in the right way (i.e. the truth or falsity of  one will 
feature in the explanation for the truth or falsity of  the other, or else their truth values will have a 
common explanation). This will not be the case when p and q are completely unrelated. Thus, we capture 
a second sense in which knowledge-yielding communication requires content similarity. 
 
On the resulting view knowledge-yielding communication will usually break down when it is a mere 
coincidence that the propositions entertained by the speaker and hearer correspond in truth value. This 
will be the case even when each proposition is true in all nearby worlds, and it will be the case even when 
some third party is present so safeguard against a lack of  coordination in truth value.31 For example, if  
we were to produce a version of  BEER in which Marie somehow took Sam to be asking whether there 
was any beer left at a different completely unrelated party, and asserted “there isn’t any beer left” on the 
basis of  this knowledge, then we would be able to predict Sam’s failure to acquire knowledge, even given 
Molly’s presence and dispositions. 
 
6. The Problem of  Strange and Fleeting Communication 
 
We now have an account of  knowledge-yielding communication which solves all the problems we 
identified for the simple and content similarity views. HYBRID LUCK captures the inconsistency of  
knowledge-yielding communication with luck. It allows for slight variation in meaning assignment 
between interlocutors. But, at the same time, it predicts that radical divergence in meaning precludes 
knowledge. Moreover, it allows us to capture the ways in which the social environment in which an 
exchange takes place can affect the occurrence of  knowledge-yielding communication.32  
 
However, as noted in §5, luck is not the only factor capable of  undermining knowledge. If  a belief  is 
true in a deviant way then, even if  it is non-lucky, it will fail to constitute knowledge. This is illustrated by 
what Greco (1999) calls ‘the problem of  strange and fleeting processes’; the problem that utterly bizarre 
processes, not of  the sort we would normally take to support knowledge, can lead agents to have reliably 
true beliefs. The problem is illustrated by the following cases (from Plantinga (1993) and Pritchard 
(2012)): 
                                                 
31 Importantly, safeguarding against lack of  coordination is not the same as positively causing coordination. As we will see in 
§6, there are cases in which HYBRID LUCK is satisfied despite the propositions entertained by each interlocutor being 
unrelated. These cases involve a third party who not only safeguards against miscommunication, but positively brings 
about the coordination. 
32 I don’t claim that modal and explanatory instability exhaust the forms of  instability which can render an event lucky. By 
further investigating the notion of  luck we will be able to better understand the ways in which interlocutors must relate in 
order for knowledge-yielding communication to occur. However, I will not go beyond HYBRID LUCK here, as we 
already have enough to solve the problems we encountered with the simple view. 
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BRAIN: Sandy has a brain lesion. He has not visited a doctor, nor has he experienced headaches 
or any of  the other symptoms we would normally associate with brain lesions. Nonetheless, he 
believes that he has a brain lesion. This is because he has an unusual type of  brain lesion which 
causes its victims to believe they have a brain lesion, even if  they lack any additional evidence 
that they have a brain lesion. 
 
TEMP: Temp forms his beliefs about the temperature in the room by consulting a thermometer. 
His beliefs, so formed, are highly reliable, in that any belief  he forms on this basis will always be 
correct. Moreover, he has no reason for thinking that there is anything amiss with his 
thermometer. But the thermometer is in fact broken, and is fluctuating randomly within a given 
range. Unbeknownst to Temp, there is an agent hidden in the room who is in control of  the 
thermostat whose job it is to ensure that every time Temp consults the thermometer the 
"reading" on the thermometer corresponds to the temperature in the room. Pritchard (2012), 
260. 
 
In BRAIN Sandy’s belief  is true, and its truth is not a matter of  luck. However, it does not constitute 
knowledge, as it is formed in a deviant way. In TEMP Temp’s belief  is true, and its truth is not a matter 
of  luck. Moreover, Temp’s belief  is formed in a non-deviant way. However, it is rendered non-lucky in a 
deviant way. The lesson here is that only certain kinds of  reliable process are capable of  yielding 
knowledge. In order to constitute knowledge one’s belief  must be true and safe in the right way. For 
example, it has been postulated that, in order to constitute knowledge one’s safe true belief  must be 
explained by the exercise of  one’s cognitive abilities (Greco (1999), Sosa (2007), Pritchard (2012), 
Broncano-Berrocal (forthcoming)), be explained by the proper functioning of  one’s cognitive systems 
(Plantinga (1993), Graham (2016, forthcoming)), or be explained in a characteristic or normal way (Peet 
and Pitcovski (2018)). 
 
A similar problem arises with respect to knowledge-yielding communication: HYBRID LUCK can be 
satisfied in the wrong way. Consider the following example:  
 
COORDINATION DEMON: The coordination demon has a strange habit. It spends its life 
guaranteeing that interlocutors coordinate on truth values. It selects two victims, waits until they 
are about to communicate, and then uses its mind reading powers to come to know both what 
proposition is intended by the speaker, and what proposition will likely be recovered by the 
audience. Its action from then on depends on whether the propositions entertained by the 
speaker and hearer match in truth value. If  they do match in truth value then, no matter how 
bizarrely unrelated the propositions are, the demon does nothing. However, if  they don’t match 
in truth value, then the demon changes the internal wiring of  the audience’s brain so that they 
interpret the speaker has having said something with the same truth value as the speaker’s 
intended proposition (this proposition may, but need not be related to the proposition the 
speaker intends). 
 
This situation might play out in different ways, not all of  which are problematic. For example, consider 
the case in which the demon is present, but does not intervene because, despite entertaining completely 
unrelated propositions, the thoughts of  two interlocutors correspond in truth value. Knowledge-yielding 
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communication has not occurred in this situation. Yet, the agents could not easily have had 
representational states which differ in truth value. Moreover, it might be thought non-coincidental that 
their thoughts correspond in truth value, as the demon would guarantee that they match in truth value. 
However, this is a mistake. The actual fact that their thoughts correspond in truth value is explained by a 
coincidence. The demon played no role in bringing about this state of  affairs. The demon might 
naturally think “wow, it is lucky that I didn’t have to intervene in this situation”. So, when the demon 
does nothing we are able to straightforwardly capture the audience’s failure to acquire knowledge in by 
appeal to HYBRID LUCK.  
 
More problematic are cases in which the demon does have to intervene. Consider the following 
development: Bjorn intends to communicate that Obama is the current president. Berit gets mixed up 
between Obama and Trump, and would interpret Bjorn as asserting the proposition most of  us would 
express by saying “Trump is the current president”. The coordination demon intervenes, re-wiring 
Berit’s brain so that she now takes “Obama” to refer to “the Great Barrier Reef ”, and “the president” to 
mean “immune to pollution”. So, she ends up entertaining a proposition which is false, and thus 
corresponds in truth value to the proposition intended by Bjorn. Knowledge-yielding communication 
has not occurred in this case, yet HYBRID LUCK is satisfied.33 
 
This failure of  knowledge-yielding communication has nothing to do with luck though. Bjorn and Berit’s 
coordination on truth values was brought about intentionally by the coordination demon. This illustrates 
that the elimination of  communicative luck is not, by itself, sufficient for knowledge-yielding 
communication. The problem here parallels the problem of  strange and fleeting processes: coordination 
must not only be reliable, it must also be explicable in the right way. A full account of  knowledge-
yielding communication would, thus, include an account of  the admissible processes which can underlie 
coordination. It is natural, at this juncture, to turn to sophisticated reliabilist approaches to knowledge, 
such as proper functionalism, virtue reliabilism, or normality approaches. For example, we might 
maintain that coordination must arise from the proper functioning of  the interlocutors’ cognitive 
systems, and perhaps the communicative and linguistic norms which have developed to support 
communication. We might maintain that knowledge-yielding communication must be explicable in terms 
of  the interlocutors’ social, linguistic, and epistemic abilities. Or we might simply maintain that 
interlocutors must coordinate in a characteristic or normal way. Any such approach would allow us to 
deny that the coordination demon’s meddling is able to support knowledge-yielding communication.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
If  two interlocutors communicate in such a way that the audience is unable to form a true, non-lucky, 
and non-deviant communication based belief, then the audience will not be able to gain communication 
based knowledge. When their belief  is true, non-lucky, and non-deviant, it will constitute knowledge. 
This suggests that knowledge-yielding communication occurs whenever two or more interlocutors 
                                                 
33 It might be thought that COORDINATION DEMON can be captured by appeal to coincidence. After all, the fact that 
Obama is not the president is explanatorily unrelated to the fact that the great barrier reef  is not immune to pollution. 
However, the fact that Bjorn and Berit’s actual thoughts correspond in truth value is not, in this case, explained by the 
truth of  the particular propositions they entertain. This relational fact can be fully and robustly explained without ever 
mentioning the contents of  their token thoughts. The coordination demon’s presence explains the correspondence in 
truth value without the need to mention the interlocutors’ token thoughts.  
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coordinate on truth values in a non-lucky and non-deviant way. I explicated the notion of  
communicative luck in modal and explanatory terms. The resultant view allowed us to capture the 
consistency of  knowledge-yielding communication with communicative imprecision, and to capture, in 
an informative way, the sense in which interlocutors must entertain similar contents if  communication is 
to succeed. Moreover, we were able to diagnose the problem Loar cases raise for knowledge-yielding 
communication without building anything into the semantics of  singular terms. This solution generalizes 
to other forms of  communicative success (such as understanding, which is commonly thought to be 
undermined in Loar cases) insofar as these other forms of  success constitute cognitive or social 
achievements, as such achievements are inconsistent with intervening luck.34 
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